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This thesis explores how local government support for arts and culture varies across 24 
American cities. It has proven to be challenging for researchers to accurately measure municipal 
arts support. Research on cultural policy has also often focused on the federal level, despite total 
city expenditures far exceeding national or state government support. This thesis attempts to take 
an accurate pulse of city expenditures in 2017 and correlates those spending levels to the 
variation in city ownership of arts facilities. Rooted in the historical perspectives of the ‘new 
institutionalism’ and path-dependency, this paper argues that past decisions about taking 
ownership of cultural facilities bind budgetary decision makers in the present; the resulting 
relationships, or lack of them, drive the great variation in cultural support in American cities. 
Tracing annual funding in the present day to historical decisions made during a city’s foundation 
period provides a better understanding of how cities make these budgetary decisions, or perhaps 
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 Local government funding for arts and culture in the United States far exceeds funding 
from state and federal government. Analysists have estimated that local support for the arts is 
350% to 800% more than what the federal government supplies through the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and 180% to 300% more than the funding provided by state 
governments (Cohen 2002). Without question, cities are the key to government support to the 
arts in America. Despite this, cultural policy analysis continues to focus on federal policy 
(Netzer, 1978; Benedict, 1991; Cherbo and Wyszomirski, 2000).  
 This research aims to re-focus arts and cultural policy analysis on the local level. It goes 
where the money is. American federalism requires that any conclusions about national policy 
include consideration of subnational units of governance. With the state and local autonomy 
characteristic of American federalism comes variation in state and local policy strategies and 
outcomes. Not only do local governments in the aggregate provide the largest amount of arts 
funding, but variation is extreme across the United States. New York City can allocate as much 
as 190 million dollars to its Department of Cultural Affairs, whereas Boston may provide less 
than three million dollars annually, a stark contrast even when controlling for city populations 
and overall budgets.  
 As recently as 1991, city funding was referred to as the “terra incognita of government 
support for the arts” and the funds were “yet to be precisely counted” (Cummings Jr. 1991, 77). 
This study corrects that oversight and seeks to explain the variation in local government support 





Why Do Cities Fund the Arts at Different Levels? 
 Given that local governments comprise the largest source of public funding for the arts, 
why do some spend more than others? Why does New York City fund arts and culture at 
relatively large amounts when Boston, another cultural center, does not? How do other cities 
compare and how do the similarities and disparities among them provide explanations for those 
differences? 
 The contrast between Boston and New York suggests some answers. The City of New 
York owns more than 34 cultural facilities, buildings and properties that are home to dozens of 
independently run arts and culture non-profits. While the New York City municipal government 
provides these organizations with their physical premises, often rent-free, it also provides annual 
operating support to these independently-run institutions (in addition to millions of dollars to 
non-city housed cultural organizations). This arrangement has at its origin the American 
Museum of Natural History, founded in 1869, and the Metropolitan Museum of Art, founded in 
1870. These public-private partnerships provided a template for how museums—and later 
performing arts centers, among other cultural organizations—would subsequently be created in 
other cities across the county. 
 Public-private partnerships would be replicated in Philadelphia, Milwaukee, Chicago, and 
cities across the county. The local government, in partnership with eminent local private citizens, 
would help build and maintain a cultural facility while leaving the management and operating of 
the organization to private enterprise. However, such an arrangement between local government 
and cultural facilities did not materialize in Boston. To this day, the City of Boston does not own 
any of its major cultural facilities and the lack of a stake in the facilities that house the Museum 
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of Fine Arts and Boston Symphony Hall, may likely contribute to Boston’s minimal public 
spending on arts and culture (Perez, Nelson, and Wiesner 2018, 25).1 
 Other major American cities such as Indianapolis and San Antonio also do not own many 
cultural facilities. Do those cities also have lower levels of local governmental support for arts 
and culture? If so, is there a causal relationship between cultural facility ownership and arts and 
culture funding? Did cities that failed to take ownership in the developmental stage of their local 
arts and culture environment set themselves on a path of limited engagement in this 31 billion 
dollar a year organizational field?2 Likewise, were cities that followed New York City on the 
path towards ownership of local facilities in their foundational period institutionally committing 
themselves to increased annual support of their local arts and culture organizations? 
 Describing how such funding decisions are made, economic historian Paul David writes, 
“a fundamental condition, which appears to underlie all of the instances in which economic 
resource allocation processes exhibit path dependent dynamics, is presence of micro-level 
irreversibilities—as in branching systems where a path forks into several tracks that remain 
separated and un-retraceable” (David 2007, 101). This research aims to trace whether and how 
those irreversibilities came about and to achieve a better understanding of how public funds are 




1 The City of Boston does own and operate the Strand Theatre although its does not receive much use and 
therefore it is not considered a major cultural facility (Kurkjian and Tarantino 2010). 
2 In 2015 the National Center for Arts Research measured the combined total annual budgets for nonprofit 
arts and cultural organizations with annual budgets above $50,000. Their survey of 39,292 organizations 
estimated the combined total budget size to be $31,739,398,686 with an estimated total employee figure 
of 908,175 (Z. Voss & G. B. Voss, 2017). 
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Existing Research on Arts and Culture Funding and Policy 
 Observers frequently attribute the emergence of local arts agencies (LAAs) across the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s to the passing of the National Foundation on the Arts and 
the Humanities Act of 1965, which established federal funding for the arts by creating the 
National Endowment of the Arts (NEA) and National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). 
This first American federal arts policy established an intergovernmental network of federal, 
regional, state, and local agencies (Mulcahy and Wyszomirski, 1995). What this narrative may 
overlook is the prior existence of a great deal of local government funding for arts and culture 
funding.  
 Cities like New York and Philadelphia had been funding and supporting museums, zoos, 
and botanic gardens at relatively significant levels since the nineteenth-century. In many cases, 
local city governments helped to construct and maintain the buildings that house these facilities. 
Such public-private partnerships continued to spring up into the twentieth-century, as cities 
helped to develop performing arts institutions and other forms of cultural activity.  
 Cities across the county may have made a strategic decision to coalesce disparate forms 
of cultural funding support into a single agency by founding LAAs, which also made 
coordination with state and federal agencies easier. But if researchers mistakenly look at the 
creation of the NEA and LAAs as the start of American cultural policy, they overlook a 
significant part of the story. 
 Early twentieth-century cultural policy analysis often compared the deficiencies of the 
United States to European cases (Overmyer, 1939). Indeed, given the absence of a national 
cultural policy for much of the first 200 years of American history, this type of comparison was 
illuminating and necessary. As the NEA and federal arts policy emerged in the latter half of the 
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twentieth-century, so did the study of how and why government should fund cultural activities 
(Netzer, 1978). The so-called culture wars of the 1970s and 1980s questioned the very 
worthiness of cultural funding. Critics deemed some publicly funded artists and exhibitions to be 
obscene and unworthy of taxpayer money, fueling a debate on what role, if any, government 
should play in funding the arts (Bolton, 1992). 
 More recently, cultural policy analysis has shifted its focus towards better understanding 
the broader financial and civic relevance of the cultural life of city. Sharon Zukin, in The Culture 
of Cities, examines how cities use culture to market and develop themselves (1995). Richard 
Florida’s influential work bolstered the concept of the “creative class,” workers in the artistic and 
creative world whom cities quickly sought to lure into newly established “creative districts” 
(2002; 2008). Florida’s work inspired cities across the world to build a new generation of 
cultural facilities, as urban centers sought to revitalize their economies and entice new residents 
and tourists alike (Wetherell 2017). 
 These lines of investigation certainly inform our understanding how cultural institutions 
interact with various levels of governments in the United States. They bring to mind Woodrow 
Wilson’s root question for public administration, “what the state should do and how it could do it 
most efficiently” (Sager and Rosser 2009, 1137). As important as such works are, however, they 
leave aside the fundamental question of why local funding for the arts varies so much across 
America, not only in amounts but which level of government provides the most funding and why 
that varies across municipalities. By better understanding what causes cities to fund culture at 
different levels, we may learn how the local state comes to invest in this immeasurably impactful 
aspect of city life and how this involvement, or lack of involvement, influences the artistic 
institutions that define the cultural life of American cities. 
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 The first study attempting to measure city funding for the arts was a Library of Congress 
survey of 38 cities, conducted in conjunction with efforts to establish an arts and culture fund for 
the District of Columbia (figure 1) in 1959. The difficulty of compiling consistent data across 
municipalities was evident even then, as its report to Congress included the qualifier that “since a 
definition of the phrase ‘cultural activities’ was not included…some of the information received 
and also listed on the enclosed chart may be extraneous to your purposes, depending on how one 

















Figure 1: Portion of the First Identifiable Survey of Municipal Arts Support. As performed by 
Congressional researchers for the creation of a municipal District of Columbia arts fund.         
Source: United States Congress, Congressional Record (1959). 
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 Mark Schuster (1988) further explored variance in arts funding in “An Inquiry into the 
Geographic Correlates of Government Arts Funding,” although this research measured only 
federal and state expenditures. In prior research, Schuster compared arts policies across eight 
countries and evidenced heightened levels of local government support for the arts in several 
countries, including the United States (1985). The edited volume Public Money & the Muse 
(Benedict 1991) frequently acknowledged the underexplored nature of local government 
funding, while Paul DiMaggio emphasized the need for future researchers to compile reliable 
information on such expenditures (DiMaggio 1991).  
 Many of the essays in The Arts of Democracy (2007), edited by Blake, explore the 
concept of public art in American and the role of the state in sponsoring and promoting artistic 
enterprises (2007). Kammen’s essay in “Culture and the State in America,” promotes the ideal of 
a more broad “cultural federalism” in America, linking efforts between local, state, and federal 
levels in a way yet unseen in this country. “The U.S. government has never had a national 
cultural policy – unless the decision not to have one can, in some perverse way, be considered a 
policy of sorts” (2007, 74). 
 Following the Great Recession of 2008, Rosenstein, Riley, Rocha, and Boenecke 
explored how some state governments provided general operating support via State Arts 
Agencies (SAAs) as well as through direct budget line-items and cultural trusts. They found that 
while SAA support appears somewhat equitable, line-items and other sources of funding could 
be heavily weighted towards a few recipients, particularly to those described as “hybrid public-
nonprofit institutions that serve as a basic infrastructure for the sector” (2013, 188). Such studies 
that seek to calculate total public arts expenditures, looking beyond merely a single government 
arts agency within each locality, help us work toward a more comprehensive understanding of 
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arts funding. Funding can flow from many different sources. If previous research has failed to 
look more closely at funding at the local level it can be understood to be due to this very issue: 
comparing across municipalities can be challenging as their funding mechanisms differ as much 
as their funding outputs. 
 
Measuring the Disparity 
 To understand why funding levels vary across local governments, it is necessary to 
accurately measure local spending levels. As previously acknowledged by researchers, this type 
of data can be limited and hidden. To overcome such difficulties, Americans for the Arts began 
an annual census of local arts agencies in 2015.3 The Local Arts Agency Census, a 
“comprehensive annual survey to track the budgets and programs of America’s 4,500 LAAs,” 
provides the most robust dataset currently available on annual arts spending at the local level 
(Americans for the Arts “Profile of Local Arts Agencies”). However, challenges remain when 
using it to compare localities.  
 A local arts agency, if funded directly via a city budget, may merely be one way a local 
government spends on arts and culture. City budgets contain many other significant amounts that 
flow indirectly to such functions. (For example, much arts education funding in New York City 
flows through the public school system, not the cultural organizations.)4 Expenditures 
specifically for organizations in public-private partnerships may have their own separate line-
 
3 Americans for the Arts, founded in 1996, is a national arts advocacy organization. However, its origins 
began the 1960s, and it has a history of working across all levels of government to advocate for increased 
arts funding and enhanced cultural policy. 
4 New York City spends a sizable amount of money on arts education through the department of 
education, of which much is spent engaging with public-private cultural institutions (Lorek 2016). This 
type of spending is not included in this research, but it is worth noting. It is likely that such kinds of 
funding also vary across localities. 
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items within the city budget. Similarly, the types of organizations that local arts agencies fund 
differ depending on how the municipality classifies arts and cultural activities. The New York 
City Department of Cultural Affairs not only funds museums and performing arts centers, but 
also botanic gardens, aquariums, and zoos. Dallas, on the other hand, funds zoos, aquariums, and 
botanic gardens through its parks and recreation department. This is the same challenge faced by 
congressional researchers in 1959. 
 A more uniform definition of arts and culture is necessary to begin to understand the true 
variation in local funding levels. This research addresses this question by defining the range of 
funding recipients broadly, as exemplified by the range of activities supported by New York 
City’s Department of Cultural Affairs. This list includes non-profit arts organizations of various 
types, as well as zoos, aquariums, and botanic gardens, in addition to individual artist 
commissions.  
 Table 1 classifies those types as organizations and funding recipients to be considered 
arts and culture funding recipients for the purposes of this research. Applying a uniform 
categorization across all cities allows us to capture the variation in the same phenomena across 
city budgets. 
 
Table 1. Categorization of Arts and Culture Funding Recipients for the Purposes of This 
Research  
 
Funding Recipient Included in Arts and Culture 
categorization for this 
research 
Museums (all types) Yes 
Performing Arts Centers Yes 
Artist Commissions Yes 
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Theaters and concert halls Yes 
Botanic Gardens Yes 
Nonprofit film centers Yes 
Zoo and aquariums Yes 
Libraries No 
Capital constructions costs (when identifiable) No 
Exclusively educational schools and/or colleges  No 
Indirect arts funding through the education system  No 
Convention Centers and Arenas No 
  
 Since the previously mentioned American for the Arts’ LAA Census provides an 
inconsistent, self-reported methodology of arts and culture spending, this more uniform 
definition provides a better basis for measuring arts and culture funding across localities. 
 The most recently available 2018 LAA Census examines fiscal year 2017 expenditures, 
so this independent data gathering uses the same study year, so that the findings could be 
compared to the LAA Census. Data gathering examined the detailed operating budgets for 24 
cities for fiscal year 2017 and aggregated all relevant spending components. Table 2 provides 
summary details regarding aggregate arts and culture spending across the 24 cities. These cities 
include 24 of the 25 largest cities in America (United States Census Bureau 2018). Washington 
D.C. was excluded as its unique location as the federal capital results in an elevated amount of 
federal arts spending. In addition, the federal government owns many of the city’s cultural 
facilities. Such an environment would clearly skew local spending data. 
 Table 2 provides the budgeted operating expenditures across all arts and culture 
categories (as defined in table 1). All pertinent city budget items were summed to provide a total 
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arts and culture expenditure for comparison (See appendix A for data sources). 2017 estimated 
populations are used to calculate a per capita spend on arts and culture (a per resident 
calculation of total arts and culture expenditure divided by 2017 estimated total population). In 
addition, the overall city operating budgets are used to calculate the share of the total budget 
used for arts and culture. Those amounts range of 0.09% (Indianapolis) to 1.56% (Dallas) of 
total city operating budgets. 
 










Capita Spend on 
Arts and Culture 
 
Share of Total 
Budget Used for 
Arts and Culture 
Austin, TX $22,758,629 $23.91 0.47% 
Boston, MA $2,687,516 $3.90 0.11% 
Charlotte, NC $8,836,020 $10.28 0.68% 
Chicago, IL $66,500,151 $24.51 0.80% 
Columbus, OH $8,147,615 $9.24 0.46% 
Dallas, TX $39,486,120 $29.40 1.56% 
Denver, CO $17,148,804 $24.31 0.90% 
Detroit, MI $2,970,000 $4.41 0.16% 
El Paso, TX $11,545,655 $16.91 1.33% 
Fort Worth, TX $14,452,888 $16.51 0.82% 
Houston, TX $26,081,870 $11.25 0.51% 
Indianapolis, IN $1,000,000 $1.16 0.09% 
Jacksonville, FL $10,305,566 $11.56 0.47% 
Los Angeles, CA $17,623,401 $4.43 0.20% 
Nashville-Davidson, TN $5,375,000 $8.08 0.26% 
New York, NY $181,774,411 $21.54 0.22% 
Philadelphia, PA $8,696,688 $5.50 0.21% 
Phoenix, AZ $7,105,983 $4.35 0.26% 
Portland, OR $8,113,328 $12.51 0.21% 
San Antonio, TX $11,100,779 $7.34 0.56% 
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San Diego, CA $27,721,054 $19.60 0.94% 
San Francisco, CA $53,945,042 $61.36 0.60% 
San Jose, CA $16,323,981 $15.82 0.69% 
Seattle, WA $28,551,258 $39.13 0.53% 
Mean $24,927,157 $16.13 0.55% 
Median $12,999,272 $12.03 0.52% 
 
 Figure 2 illustrates the extreme variation in total arts and culture expenditure across 
American cities in FY 2017. Totals range from one million dollars in fiscal year 2017 arts 


















































Figure 2. Total City Arts and Culture Expenditures in FY 2017 Operating Budgets. 
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 Figure 3 shows the same distribution, controlling for population (total arts and culture 
expenditure divided by 2017 estimated population). Although the variation is less extreme and 
the overall ranking of cities changes, the disparity continues. These two charts show just how 




 As expected, New York City and Boston mark two extremes of local spending on arts 

















































Figure 3. Total Per Capita Arts and Culture Expenditures in FY 2017 Operating Budgets 
(Ordered by total Budget Amount). 
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only ranks seventh on a per capita basis. San Francisco has the highest level of local government 
support per capita, while Indianapolis and Detroit join Boston as the lowest funders. San 
Francisco’s city budget provides a significant amount of funding both to specific museums, 
particularly public-private partnerships in city-owned buildings, as well as to the San Francisco 
Arts Commission. Los Angeles, which ranks ninth in overall spending (spending more than 17 
million in 2017), provides only $4.43 in per capita arts spending, suggesting the importance of 
controlling for population when analyzing local government arts funding. When controlling for 
population the amount of some city’s expenditures can be lessened or made more significant. 
 The median value of $12.03 in per capita funding provides a standard against which to 
grade cities as having high or low funding levels. (While table 2 also provides a measure of arts 
funding as a proportion of the overall city budget, the many other factors that may shape the 
contents of any city budget make that a far less informative measure than per capita arts funding 
for the purpose of this research.) 
 
Explaining the Variation 
 
 What explains this variation in arts and culture funding? Funding levels do not appear to 
be correlated to region or city size, especially on a per capita basis. While most American cities 
lean Democratic, some cities with Republican mayors, such as Forth Worth and San Diego, are 
on the higher end of funding levels.5 This suggests that arts and culture funding may be 
attributed to reasons beyond party affiliation, population, or geographic location. 
 Nor can we attribute arts and culture funding to the relative importance of the arts and 
cultural sectors to a given city. SMU DataArts, a nationally recognized research foundation 
 




focused on the arts and culture sector, produces an annual “Arts Vibrancy Index” meant to 
measure levels of arts and culture in cities across the United States. Many of the cities with the 
lowest levels of local government funding—Boston, Nashville-Davidson, and Philadelphia—
regularly appear as among the most vibrant arts cities in America, as measured by the population 
of artists, number of organizations and employees, revenue, among other metrics (Z. Voss and G. 
Voss, et al. 2017; 2018; 2019). Levels of local government support does not appear to be 
sufficiently caused by increased levels of arts and culture within a city, although prior research 
has suggested that an increased number of arts organizations is a necessary condition for 
government support (Schuster 1988). 
 Returning to the idea first drawn from looking at Boston and New York City, we can 
explore whether the city ownership of cultural facilities, or the lack thereof, helps explain 
variation in arts and culture funding. We can begin by looking at the extent to which city 
governments in these 24 cities own the buildings and land that house their museums and other 
cultural organizations. This involved a second data gathering effort, alongside the examination of 
the detailed budgets, to determine the ownership of arts and cultural organizations and facilities, 
as defined in table 1. Research has found that no such data has been previously collected. 
 This dataset was constructed by examining the largest cultural organizations in each city, 
as defined by their annual operating budgets and expenditures. (Organizational operating budgets 
were drawn from the Cultural Data Profile developed by SMU DataArts—an annual survey of 
financial, programmatic, and demographic information on cultural nonprofits.) This list was then 
cross-referenced against GuideStar, a database of United States based non-profit organizations, 
to ensure that data was gathered from any large organization and/or facility that may not have 
participated in SMU DataArts’ Cultural Data Profile survey.  
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 As some cultural organizations may share operations within the same physical venue, 
particularly in the performing arts, this dataset treats each venue as the unit of observations, not 
the individual organizations. In many cases a cultural center unifies multiple venues, such as 
Lincoln Center in New York City or the Blumenthal Performing Arts Center in Charlotte, North 
Carolina.  Data was gathered for six to nine cultural facilities for each of the 24 cities. These 
cultural facilities can be thought of as the anchor arts facilities for their locality’s cultural 
industry.6  
 To determine whether the local government owned an anchor arts facility, a recent 
audited financial statement was reviewed. An audited financial statement typically describes the 
organization’s relationship to its facilities and buildings. If the buildings are city-owned, such an 
arrangement is typically detailed. The Dallas Museum of Art, for example, details this 
relationship in its audited financial statement as, “under an agreement with the City of Dallas, all 
on-site land and buildings of the Museum are the property of the City” (Dallas Museum of Art 
2019). If the organization itself owns the facility, it reports those building(s) as assets, valued in 
the millions.  Less commonly, some organizations may rent their facilities from a private 
landlord and the audited financial statement lists the rent as an expenditure. 
 For organizations that did not make their audited financial statements public, the study 
reviewed IRS form 990s to determine whether the organization listed the building as an asset. As 
990s do not provide as much context as audited financial statements, if no building assets were 
reported, indicating possible third-party ownership, then the investigation turned to news 
 
6 Anchor institutions were first introduced as a concept that included non-profits, universities, and 
hospitals. Karen Brooks Hopkins uses the concept “anchor arts institutions” more particularly to describe 
“anchor cultural institutions” which are “enduring [arts] organizations that remain in their geographic 
locations and play a vital role in their local communities and economies” (Brooks Hopkins 2019). For the 
purposes of this research the term anchor arts facility draws from Brooks Hopkins. 
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accounts, building records, annual reports, or other historical records to determine the ownership 
of the facilities. The resulting information is detailed in appendix A, which shows the ownership 
of the largest anchor arts facilities in each of the 24 cities.  
 Facilities are listed as either 100% city-owned, 0% city-owned, or a proportion in 
between, particularly where privately-owned facilities were on city land.7 Figure 4 orders the 
annual per capita arts funding for fiscal year 2017 according to the level of local government 
ownership of their anchor arts cultural facilities. Figure 5, using the same data, provides a 
scatterplot of city ownership and per capita funding, as well as a linear regression model, 
illustrating the strong positive correlation between a city owning its anchor arts facilities and 








7 Ground lease arrangements with local government were found in several cities including Chicago, 




















































































Figure 4. Per Capita Expenditures in FY 2017, Ordered by Ownership Levels of Anchor Arts 




 As the scatterplot suggests, there is a strong and rising correlationship between ownership 
of a city’s largest cultural facilities and public funding for arts and culture. Future research may 
seek to include a more exhaustive survey of cultural organizations and facilities, but this initial 
inquiry of only six to nine of the largest anchor arts facilities, illustrates how strongly the two 
variables are correlated. The intercept of -2.0571, although a theoretical impossibility, suggests 















y = **0.3259x - 2.0571



























Share of City Ownership of Anchor Arts Facilities
Figure 5. Scatterplot of Per Capita Arts Funding and Ownership of Anchor Arts Facilities. 
OLS Fit (Bold Line) and 95% Confidence Bands (Dashed Lines). 
Note: **Ownership of Facilities Coefficient of 0.3259, statistically significant at 95% confidence 
level. p < .01 
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cultural facilities. The model predicts an approximate funding level of 30 dollars per capita 
annually if ownership of anchor arts facilities is at 100%.  
 The OLS model is less accurately predictive of funding levels the higher the level of 
ownership. The spread of outliers increases as ownership increases, with Charlotte and Phoenix 
particularly underperforming as arts funders, despite a relatively high level of ownership. San 
Francisco has a per capita funding level more than double many of its peers, and well outside the 
model’s estimate.8  
 This may have to do with the limited survey of facilities in each city, although it may also 
indicate a necessary but insufficient condition for increased annual funding. While none of the 
cities with less than 50% of ownership of its anchor arts facilities provided more than $12 per 
capita in annual arts funding in 2017 (and were all well inside the model’s prediction), all cities 
with higher levels of per capita arts spending had elevated levels of ownership. Several cities, 
including Jacksonville, Phoenix, Houston, and Charlotte, have high levels of ownership without 
increased funding levels. Future research on why this discrepancy exists in these cities would 
provide further insights into the mechanisms at play in municipal arts funding. Those four cities 
can all be described as late-developing, corporate service cities, while their ownership of cultural 
facilities is heavily weighted by newer, corporate sponsored facilities. Such a condition will be 
explored later in this research. 
 
8 San Francisco’s elevated level of annual funding is heavily weighted by funding to two institutions: The 
Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco (which includes the de Young Museum and the Legion of Honor) 
and the San Francisco Asian Art Museum. Those three museums received half of the total 54 million 
dollars in city arts funding in fiscal year 2017. All three museums are in city-owned buildings and their 
relationship with the city is written into the city charter further emphasizing the correlation of facility 
ownership to funding. 
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 Figure 6 illustrates the necessary but insufficient condition evident for increased levels of 
annual operating support. It categorizes cities as having high or low levels of funding, with the 
median value of $12.03 as the threshold, and high or low levels or core facility ownership, above 
or below 50%.  
 
    Level of Annual Funding 






































Figure 6: Correlation Outcomes Between Levels of Anchor Arts Facility 
Ownership and Annual Funding 
 
 Figure 6 illustrates that the twelve cities with the highest annual per capita funding levels 
all have elevated levels of ownership among their anchor arts facilities. Of the 12 cities with the 
lowest funding, five have high ownership without additional funding, and seven cities have both 




































 Additionally, research has found that a high proportion of the total arts budget in most 
cities is designated to public-private partnership organizations that live in city buildings. 
Chicago, Dallas, Fort Worth, Seattle, San Francisco, and New York City all designated more 
than 50% of their arts budget to those organizations that live in city buildings. Even cities with 
low funding levels allocated a high proportion of their funding to the few public-private 
partnerships that are present in their city, including Phoenix, Philadelphia, Nashville-Davidson, 
and Detroit. Detroit had its entire three million dollar arts budget allocated to three city-owned 
facilities: the Charles H. Wright Museum of African American History, the Detroit Historical 
Museum, and the Detroit Zoo.9 
 
Origins of City Ownership – New York City vs Boston 
 If ownership of cultural facilities helps explain a city’s funding levels for arts and culture, 
what explains why a city decides to take ownership in the first place? What is the origin of a 
city’s willingness to take ownership or build a cultural facility such as a museum or performing 
arts center?  While it is not feasible at this stage to explore the origin stories in all 24 cities, 
further exploration of the New York and Boston cases offers some important leads. 
 Boston and New York City exemplify two different approaches to the beginnings of the 
modern American museum. In New York City the public-private partnership began with the 
founding of the American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
Boston’s arts landscape was originally framed by the private founding of The Museum of Fine 
 
9 Zoos in particular, as considered art and culture organizations, can take a sizable portion of a city’s 
allocation. El Paso, Fort Worth, and San Diego all spent more than half of their expenditures on the city 
zoo. Zoos are also the most likely type of organization to be city-owned, even among cities with low 
ownership shares of their anchor arts facilities. 
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Arts, Boston. The Met Museum and the MFA were both founded in 1870s, in what were then the 
largest and seventh largest cities in America. New York City, at the time consisting of only 
Manhattan and the Bronx, had a population of 942,292, while Boston’s population was 250,526 
(United States Census Bureau 1870). Emerging from the Civil War, both cities were prosperous 
and wealthy benefactors were interested in creating impressive museums to rival those in Europe 
(Horowitz 1989, 1-26).  
 The Union League Club, having taken upon itself the task of constructing a plan for the 
creation of a fine arts museum in New York, recorded at their October 14, 1869 meeting, “It will 
be said that it would be folly to depend upon our governments, either municipal or national, for 
judicious support or control in such an institution; for our governments, as a rule, are utterly 
incompetent for the task” (Howe and Watson 1913, 102). Though this was an inauspicious 
opening for a partnership with the City of New York, a group of city elites, officials, artists, and 
notable men gathered with the Union League Club a month later to make official the plan for the 
Metropolitan Museum of Art, choosing a setting of Central Park, and striking a partnership with 
New York City’s Park Commissioners to participate in the funding and creation of the Museum.  
 The New York Evening Mail wrote, “the cooperation of the Park Commissioners means, 
in the first place, a site worth half a million dollars, whereon to erect a museum; secondly, it 
means invaluable assistance in raising the necessary funds to erect the building; and thirdly, it 
means invaluable advice in its construction and the best custodianship of it and its treasures 
when it is a completed thing” (Howe and Watson 1913, 118). 
“The actual housing of the Museum there [in Central Park], in a building erected and 
owned by the city, and the lease which defines the relationship between the museum and the city 
in its occupation of the building, bear testimony to the wisdom of its founders and the far-sighted 
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policy of those public officials who at the time of its organization represented our city” (Howe 
and Watson 1913, viii-ix). 
It is worth noting that this occurred in the same year as a similar public-private 
partnership creating the American Museum of Natural History on the west side of Central Park. 
It is often written that the AMNH was the founding institution for public-private cultural 
partnership in America, and while technically true, much of the planning and progress happened 
concurrently with the founding of the Met Museum. 
The following year, both the Met Museum and AMNH projects would require New York 
State to pass special legislation authorizing the City and Department of Parks to issue public 
bonds to enable them to begin construction. “For several weeks previous to this date a committee 
of the Museum working jointly with a committee from the American Museum of Natural History 
had exorcised all vigilance and discretion in pushing this bill through the Legislature” (Howe and 
Watson 1913, 138).  
“In Boston there was no free land in a public park to settle on as it profited the 
Metropolitan Museum to do in New York’s Central Park” (Rathbone 1984, 43).  In partnership 
with the Boston Athenæum, a private membership library, benefactors secured funds exclusively 
from private donors without funding from local government. Perry T. Rathbone, President of the 
Museum of Fine Art from 1955 to 1972, writes enviously of the city funding and foundational 
support received by their regional neighbors: 
The experience of the Metropolitan Museum, though almost as private an 
institution as the Museum of Fine Arts, was of wide variance in influencing the 
public policy of New York City. The gifts received and the popularity of the 
Metropolitan in its first years had their effect on the city [of Boston] fathers, so 
much so that as early as 1896, the Boston trustees, bitterly suffering their deficits, 
could look with envy upon their rival which had received $90,000 from the New 
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York City treasury for current expenses. Such municipal ‘care and feeding’ 
ordained by public policy has continued in lesser or greater degree ever since. 
(Rathbone 1984, 46) 
 
Speaking at a symposium in New York City in 1983, Rathbone would describe what he 
perceived as the reasons for the lack of involvement of the City of Boston in the creation of the 
Museum of Fine Arts. He placed the decision on the shoulders of the Museum founders, and the 
culture of the Boston public, not on any overt policy decision by the city government, “I think 
what Bostonians feared from the beginning was the possible involvement of the city government. 
That’s what they hoped to avoid at all costs, and with good reason…It’s not public land and it 
never was.” (Lowry 1984, 153). He described an origin story where it was not the City of Boston 
who was unwilling to partner in the creation of a city-owned museum, but that the museum 
founders thought such a partnership untenable. This is not unlike the previously shared opinion 
of The Union League Club, just a month prior to the Met Museum’s founding in New York City. 
Yet, despite the Museum of Fine Arts founders’ aversion to a public-private partnership, they 
nonetheless would seem to have later regretted that decision, “looking on with envy” in harder 
times. The differences in these two beginnings, in Boston and New York City, suggest the 
precariousness of decision-making that potential public-private partnerships rest upon, and the 
long legacy the follows them.  
DiMaggio also explores the origins of the MFA and its founders, the culturally elite 
Boston Brahmins, who were perhaps reticent to partner with a city government increasingly 
made up of members of the populist Know-Nothings party. As Boston’s political establishment 
became more hostile to the elite class, the Brahmins sought to maintain “some control over the 
community” through the creation of a system of non-profit institutions, of which the MFA was a 
primary component (DiMaggio 1986, 48).  
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The MFA would continue to proclaim proudly its independence from government 
support well into the twentieth-century. Within its annual handbook, as early as 1910, the MFA 
would state that “no support from State or City was provided for, and none has ever been 
received. In Granting the Museum the site of the first building in Copley Square, the City acted 
as an agent for the Boston Water Power Company, from who it had received the property for a 
museum or park” (MFA Boston 1964, 379). Within its main rotunda, an inscription would also 
proclaim it as a museum “built and maintained entirely with the gifts of private citizens” 
although it would later be removed in 1966, when the MFA received a $100,000 grant from the 
State of Massachusetts to underwrite school visits (Clotfelter 1991, 238). 
 Public-private partnerships, during the era of Reconstruction through the Progressive era 
of 1865 to 1916, benefited from the ideals of cultural elites and city officials who sought to grow 
American cities into cultured and respected global cities. Later, the New Deal saw a short-lived 
increase in federal funding for new cultural facilities. This “radical departure” from previous 
involvement in the arts by the federal government nonetheless made a lasting contribution to the 
cultural landscape in America (Cummings Jr 1991, 40-41).  
 The latter half of the twentieth-century saw new cultural facilities being built as tools of 
economic development in cities. Many were built with a new aim of renewing and reviving 
urban centers after periods of economic and social decline. Cities like New York, Chicago, and 
Seattle put efforts into including new cultural centers, and increasingly included the performing 
arts into their plans for urban revitalization (Foulkes 2010; Gilfoyle 2006; Strom 2003). 
Regardless of the era, the public-private partnerships that occurred after those initial institutional 
arrangements in New York City, all owe a debt of gratitude to an innovative form of governance 
that allows for autonomy as well as continued financial support. 
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Causation or Merely Correlation? 
 Returning to the correlation between ownership and funding, the question then becomes 
whether this is simply a measurement of the same effect. Is the ownership of cultural facilities 
and corresponding annual funding expenditure merely the same output of a city government’s 
willingness to support arts and culture? There is reason to suspect that they are not the same 
thing, and that ownership is a causal variable that affects the level of support within a city’s 
annual operating budget. 
 The following sections will draw on theories from historical institutionalism, new 
institutionalism, and path dependency. This work emphasizes the effects that decisions can have 
on the creation of institutions, and how those processes may bind future decision making and 
often result in unintended consequences. 
 Suggesting that these theories will help explain why facility ownership is a causal 
mechanism, one that leads to increased support for arts and culture, will proceed by emphasizing 
four concepts: 
 Ownership of cultural facilities can be thought of as the first step in a process of 
institutionalization of arts and culture within city government. 
 Decisions made regarding taking or accepting ownership of cultural facilities, 
particularly at their origin, are often made without intentions of providing elevated 
levels of operating support. 
 Increased levels of annual operating support may be delayed following initial 
periods of ownership. The effect is a process that occurs over time. 
 Once in effect, increased levels of ownership and funding can be difficult to de-
escalate. Budgetary decision-makers are confined by historic decisions and 
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processes. Uncoupling city government from ownership is rare and requires 
exogenous forces. 
 
The Institutionalization of Arts and Culture Within City Government 
 To suggest that a city’s ownership of cultural facilities institutionalizes a specific form of 
arts and cultural policy, we must clarify what we mean by the term institution. Drawing heavily 
from the work of March and Olsen, Peters defines this frequently nebulous term by distilling its 
most durable characteristics. Institutions are persisting formal structures, with interrelated rules 
and routines that can bind behaviors, even if such behaviors can go against a member’s self-
interest (Peters 2019). 
 Tolbert and Zucker describe the act of institutionalization as a process that unfolds over 
time. Rather than a binary state, institutionalization processes can be sequential and contain 
patterns and variations that require qualitative analysis (Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Their work, 
defining the process of institutionalization, describes three stages—habitualization, 
objectification, and sedimentation—and suggests variability with each stage (1999). 
 Habitualization involves “the generation of new structural arrangements in response to a 
specific organizational problem or set of problems” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996, 181). This stage 
could describe the origination of public-private partnerships in New York City and the founding 
of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and the American Museum of Natural History. Institutional 
entrepreneurs used these public-private partnerships to overcome obstacles in creating 
foundational museums in nineteenth-century New York City. Land and resources were needed, 
and this relationship allowed for the construction to take place in city parkland, with some 
funding provided by the municipal government. As Zucker and Tolbert suggest, “imitation may 
29 
 
follow [habitualization], but there is little sense of the necessity of this among organizational 
decision-makers, since there is no consensus on the general utility of the innovation” (1996, 
181). Boston fits such a scenario, among other cities, because no public-private partnership was 
sought to launch the Museum of Fine Arts, rather it was avoided. All museums founded in 
American in the years following the New York museums were aware of the public-private 
innovation. The long-term outcomes, however, from that organizational arrangement were yet to 
be known. 
 Objectification follows habitualization. For the structure created during the prior stage to 
expand and spread, decision-makers must share an understanding of its value and meaning. In 
New York City’s context, that could include city officials, bureaucrats, as well as arts and culture 
administrators.10 Outcomes that emerged from city-ownership of museums, such as an emphasis 
on public access and education, as well as financial stability and expansion, led elites to a shared 
understanding of what it means for a museum to live in a city-owned building. By the turn of the 
twentieth-century, Boston’s museum officials envied the increasing amount of local government 
support received by New York institutions and acknowledged that funding’s link to early 
decisions on facility ownership (Rathbone 1984). 
 Finally, a stage of sedimentation concludes the process of institutionalization. 
Sedimentation replicates the new structure, in this case the city-ownership of cultural facilities, 
across the country. In addition, “the perpetuation of structures over a lengthy time” further 
 
10 Within a nineteenth-century context, arts and culture professionals may be thought of as exclusively 
museum leaders and board members. A more broadly defined organizational field of arts and culture, 
including the performing arts, among other art forms, would only become widely accepted into the 
twentieth-century, perhaps as the result of its own process of institutionalization. 
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cements the breadth and endurance of what was once innovative and new (Tolbert and Zucker 
1996). 
 Once fully institutionalized, it is increasingly difficult to reverse these structures. Within 
New York City, more cultural organizations and facilities would be incorporated into the 
arrangement. The Bronx Zoo and The New York Botanical Garden would join in being built as 
public-private partnerships with New York City’s municipal government. In Brooklyn, while 
still an independent city, additional homes for cultural organizations would be constructed in 
buildings owned by local government. These New York City institutions would later come to 
form the Cultural Institutions Group (CIG), a quasi-formal organization of arts and cultural non-
profits that all reside in city-owned buildings (NYC Department of Cultural Affairs “History of 
Cultural Institutions Group”).  
 Elsewhere in America, Chicago and Seattle elites would build their own cultural facilities 
in partnership with local government.11 By the first half of the twentieth-century, the 
sedimentation of public-private partnerships between arts non-profits and city government had 
been fully realized. This sedimentation is evident both externally, as the model of the public-
private partnership proliferated across the country, but also within cities, as places like New 
York, Chicago, Dallas, and San Francisco replicated the model as their cultural facility portfolios 
expanded. 
 This three-stage process helps conceptualize the institutionalization of arts and culture 
within city government. Ownership of cultural facilities is the first stage in the process of 
creating formalized rules and mechanisms to structure the relationship between the arts and 
 
11 Chicago saw many of its cultural building built in Grant Park, via ground leases with the City of 
Chicago. Although the non-profits retained ownership of the buildings, these ground lease arrangements 
formed a similar public-private partnership to that of city-ownership. 
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culture sector and city government. With ownership, more funding is likely, as evidenced by the 
previous analysis of 24 cities. The current funding levels and ownership-stakes are bound by pre-
existing relationships that endure and become sediment within the city bureaucracy. Instances of 
change within this system, to be illustrated later, are rare and require significant exogenous 
forces. 
 Cities that lack this structure, who have not institutionalized arts and culture, all have low 
levels of funding for their local non-profits. Furthermore, the lack of a formalized relationship 
leaves what little funding there is vulnerable to austerity. 
 This suggestion that the institutionalization of arts and cultural policy in American cities 
comes from ownership of facilities, emerging from a New York City public-private model, is in 
contrast to DiMaggio focus on the institutionalization of “high culture” stemming from 
nineteenth-century Boston (DiMaggio 1986). DiMaggio’s theory of institutionalism within the 
arts, however, refers specifically to the organizational structure and governance model of cultural 
non-profits. His argument does not necessarily conflict with the idea that a broader model of the 
institutionalization of American arts in relation to local governments emerged from New York 
City.  
 It can be said, however, that Boston’s model of privately-controlled cultural 
organizations, as described by DiMaggio, often deters the outcomes that emerge from a New 
York City model, where local government has the additional authority to be an agenda-setting 
partner in the arts and culture industry. DiMaggio writes that Boston’s Museum of Fine Arts was 
founded with a broad educational mission, one that ebbed over the course of several decades and 
ultimately led the MFA to “abandon its broad social mission in favor of aestheticism and an elite 
clientele” (DiMaggio 1986, 58). In contrast, those arts and culture organizations institutionalized 
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within city government seem inclined to move towards a broader social mission over time. To 
the extent that a purely artistic-focused agenda can at times conflict with a broader social 
mission, city government can, at the best of times, be an altruistic force bending organizations 
towards more equitable and inclusive practices.  
 
Increasing Returns: Path Dependent Models of Ownership and Support 
 If taking ownership of cultural facilities is the first step in one specific form of 
institutionalization of arts and cultural activities, what aspect of this process results in increased 
public support for operational expenses? Drawing on the work of Paul Pierson, this section 
explores how increased operating support results from facility ownership + time + constrained 
decision making + increased political authority, specifically among actors within city 
government and the arts and culture organizational field. 
 Pierson suggests that “analysts are increasingly inclined to invoke path dependence, but 
clear definitions are rare” (2004, 20). Intending to move beyond mere platitudes that “history 
matters,” Pierson attempts to clarify key processes and concepts for its use within political and 
public policy analysis. Pierson employs the term path-dependency to mean, “social processes 
that exhibit positive feedback and thus generate branching patterns of historical development” 
(2004, 21). Prior institutional design decisions can constrain future behavior and options, leading 
to rooting particular outcomes not in the rational choices of present-day actors or even those in 
the past, but in a contextual history constrained by previous decisions. “Despite massive social, 
economic, and political changes over time, self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective 
action processes—especially high start-up costs, coordination effects, and adaptive 
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expectations—mean that organizations will have a strong tendency to persist once they are 
institutionalized” (Pierson 2004, 34). 
 Many explanations of path dependence, including Pierson’s, begin with the thought 
experiment of an urn containing two balls, one red and one blue (Pierson 2004). If you take one 
ball out randomly, and then return it to the urn with another ball of the same color, and then 
repeat the process until the urn fills up, the initial random draw may lead to a strongly weighted 
distribution of one color vs the other. Choosing a red ball initially will lead to more red balls than 
blue ones for the second draw, increasing the likelihood of drawing another red ball, adding 
another again, and again. The initial draw heavily weights the likelihood of one outcome over the 
other. 
 Can it be said the New York’s initial decision to take ownership of the city’s foundational 
museums—drawing a red ball—led to more ownership stakes in the future, and Boston’s initial 
lack of ownership—drawing a blue ball—led to a continued aversion to such public-private 
partnerships? Although neither initial decision was truly random, either outcome was possible 
and plausible. The debate was heated in New York City as to whether allowing government 
involvement in the new museum would give undue influence to powers that Union League Club 
elites deemed potentially harmful. During the same period, in Boston, although the city did not 
retain ownership, public authority was used to transfer the deed to the original plot of land, 
certainly opening up the possibility that a more lasting partnership could have ensued if the 
founders wished for it. 
 As New York City grew, the decision to form a public-private partnership did have a self-
reinforcing character as other emerging cultural organizations, including the Bronx Zoo and the 
New York Botanical Garden, joined the process. The consolidation of New York City in 1898, 
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incorporating Brooklyn, Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island, greatly expanded the footprint for 
cultural ownership. Existing organizations that lived in Brooklyn-owned facilities were now 
under the auspices of a greater New York City government. This necessitated equitable 
distribution of facilities across all five boroughs, furthering New York City’s ownership stake in 
arts and culture, now expanded to over 30 facilities. 
 Furthermore, as other cities in America built their own cultural institutions and facilities, 
decisions were made to either follow a public-private model like New York City or a laissez-
faire policy such as Boston. Cities such as Chicago and San Francisco imitated the former while 
Philadelphia and Indianapolis followed a Boston model. 
 
Mechanism of Increased Support 
 Pierson poses the question, “are path-dependent arguments just descriptive?” (2004, 91). 
It is not merely sufficient to say that history mattered, and decision-makers chose a path. 
Explaining the mechanisms that reinforce (or undermine) that initial decision is also required; 
“without this, path-dependent arguments degenerate into little more than a description of 
stability.” In addition, even stable models experience change and variation. “Change continues 
but it is bounded change—until something erodes or swamps the mechanism of reproduction that 
generate continuity” (2004, 52). 
 How does the ownership of facilities lead to an increase in annual support? If truly the 
result of a path dependent process, such a mechanism would be the result of an institutional 
effect rather than a rational choice, actor-centered functionalist outcome (Pierson 2004). This 
section will seek to identify the link between those initial decisions of ownership and the 
resulting increased levels of operating support for arts and culture. 
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 Pierson identifies several limitations of a rational-choice argument regarding institutions 
and their outcomes. These limitations dampen notions that the founding participants of an 
institution could have designed or anticipated the outcomes that follow, particularly as time 
elapses. The following limitations of a rational-choice approach, as noted by Pierson, are useful 
in identifying outcomes of cultural facility ownership by local government: 
 Institutional designers may have short time horizons 
 Effects may be unanticipated 
 Institutional continuity that persists despite environmental change 
 Actor discontinuity 
 By ruling out a functionalist argument that the institutionalization of arts and cultural 
organizations within city government, and the increased amount of economic resources that 
comes with it, is merely a product of its initial design, we can begin to identify aspects of the 
path-dependent institutional development approach that contribute to its resilience and durability. 
 The cultural elites and government officials that initiated the public-private partnerships 
that emerged in cities such as New York and Chicago were not necessarily looking to fund their 
operations with public money on a permanent basis. In most cases, despite modest commitments 
to maintain the facilities themselves, they intended for the organizations to fund their operations 
entirely themselves. Those early actors would perhaps be surprised to see the millions of dollars 
in annual operating support that now flow to city-owned, or city-leased, facilities. 
 Foundational documents for many public-private institutions detail the initial 
arrangements with city government and describe reciprocal commitments of building and 
maintenance funds in return for commitments to public service and education. Frequently, they 
made little or no commitments for continued operational support.  
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 In 1891 The Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences (BIAS), founded prior to Brooklyn’s 
incorporation into New York City, as approved by the New York State Legislature, was 
authorized to receive funds from the City of Brooklyn only “for the purpose of constructing, 
erecting and maintaining said building or buildings,” by the issuance of public Museum of Art 
and Science Bonds. By the end of the nineteenth-century additional funds were allocated from 
said fund for furnishings as well as for heating and lighting cost, totaling $10,000, with 
additional language stipulating free admission times for public schools (Brooklyn Institute of 
Arts and Sciences 1899). This kind of contractual obligation emphasizes the reciprocal benefit 
expected from city ownership and city funding. 
 By 1921, New York City funding of BIAS totaled $150,817.14, with more than $100,000 
of that allocated to staff salaries and wages (Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences 1922). In 
1966 those commitments were totaling $1,500,000 from the City of New York, in addition to 
similar commitments to the Met Museum and AMNH, among the other city-owned cultural 
facilities now comprising the Cultural Institutions Group of New York City (New York Times 
1966). Over time cultural commitments swelled from covering construction costs to funds 
necessary to maintain operations. As recently as 2016 the Brooklyn Museum, broken off from 
the Brooklyn Institute, received more the $7,000,000 from the City of New York (Brooklyn 
Museum 2016). This increase in funding overtime far exceeds that of inflation. 
 Similar narratives can be found in the financial histories of the Seattle Art Museum, first 
built on public land in Volunteer Park; the California Academy of Sciences, built in Golden Gate 
Park; and The Art Institute of Chicago, built in Grant Park. The initial period of ownership in 
each city was predicated on the gifting of city parkland, with additional commitments of 
construction and limited maintenance support. After a period of years, or even decades, 
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operational support would later come in the form of annual funds via the city budget in each 
case. Future research can explore how the slow rise in funding occurred, either by 
institutionalized arts lobbying from within city government or perhaps by museum officials who 
were able to leverage their position as quasi-public stewards into additional funding by way of 
promising public-service-centered outcomes. Obtaining time-series data may likely evidence that 
these additional operational funds tend to increase over time, at rates far above inflation. 
 The durability of annual arts funding in cities that own many of their cultural facilities is 
notable. One hypothesis, unproven without additional time-series data, is that funding not only 
rises over time, but is also more consistent and sustained in cities that have institutionalized their 
arts and culture field. In New York City, this is evident during periods of austerity under Mayor 
Lindsay, as well as following the hostile actions Mayor Giuliani took toward the Brooklyn 
Museum after opposing their display of Chris Ofili’s “The Holy Virgin Mary," a Madonna made 
from elephant dung which the mayor deemed obscene.12 Attempts to reduce funding to the 
Department of Cultural Affairs, and the occasional targeted attacks towards specific organization 
such as the Brooklyn Museum, failed due to the sustained power of the institutionalized cultural 
field in defending their budgeted support.  
 In 2003, Mayor Bloomberg sought to drastically reduce New York City’s arts funding, 
particularly to the city-housed institutions which receive the bulk of the city’s annual funding. 
Mayor Bloomberg was aiming to cut funding to the Cultural Institutions Group members by 
26%, from 105.6 million dollars to 77.7 million. The CIGs were able to unify their lobbying 
 
12 Although it was in federal court in 2000 that Mayor Giuliani lost his attempt to cut funding and 
possibly evict the Brooklyn Museum from their city building, it was through the additional coordination 
by the Museum and other CIGs that they were able to avoid severe cuts to their annual budgets in the 
years that followed. (Barstow 1999) 
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efforts in a manner that a non-institutionalized cultural sector would be unlikely to achieve. By 
lobbying city officials, and leveraging their value to the city, they were able to restore most, if 
not all, of their funding and in the following year’s budget the CIGs again received 
approximately 100 million dollars of the DCLA’s 120 million dollar budget (Pogrebin 2003; 
Mandell 2005).  
 In contrast, Indianapolis was not only the lowest funder of the 24 cities surveyed, but its 
recent history has seen significant cuts to its already modest arts budget. The budget for arts and 
culture has been reduced by at least 50% after a new mayor was elected and pushed for austerity 
measures. Not only were such cuts implemented, the reduction of funds for culture, first 
implemented in 2008, have persisted to this day (Schnitzler 2008). Cultural institutions in New 
York and Chicago, however, have been able to mobilize their cultural industry backers to push 
back against proposed cuts, or at the very least return them to original levels after a short period 
of decline. 
   
Institutional Change 
 The path is not always upward, however. Detroit and Seattle provide examples of city-
ownership de-escalating, albeit under two very different circumstances.  The Detroit Institute of 
Arts had a long history of city ownership. Following the bankruptcy of the city, however, the so-
called Grand Bargain provided for the transition of ownership of both the museum and artwork 
into a private foundation. The municipal insolvency of Detroit provides the rare example of an 
exogenous shock that causes a city government to uncouple itself from its own museum building. 
The fact that Detroit owned both the building and the artwork, itself unusual, was rooted in a 
1911 decision to allocate city funds towards the purchase of artwork for the museum (Abt 2001, 
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84). This more comprehensive institutionalization of the Institute into the local Detroit 
government—a public-public partnership—almost proved disastrous once the city began its 
economic decline in the latter half of the twentieth-century. 
 Seattle presents a more recognizable scenario in which the Seattle Art Museum (SAM) 
move in 1991 from its original city-owned Volunteer Park location, where it had been housed 
since 1933 (Fuller 1993). In contrast to Detroit, Seattle’s population and prominence exploded in 
the latter half of the twentieth-century, leaving SAM in a facility far too small for its goals of a 
grand expansion. As early as the 1970s, it began to plan for a possible move into a downtown 
location. Initially, this was expected to be facilitated by a move into another city-owned building, 
the Times Square Building, as part of the proposed Westlake Center development. Museum 
planners and officials specifically noted that a move into an expanded city-owned facility could 
result in as much as a 100% increase in annual support from the City of Seattle, further 
emphasizing the realized connection between facility ownership and annual support (Economics 
Research Associates & Seattle Art Museum 1978). 
 Ultimately SAM made its move through an “innovative but untimely partnership with the 
now-dissolved Washington Mutual” bank (Ashley 2014). By foregoing any chance for a public-
private partnership, SAM went down the path of a corporate-private partnership, one that has 
resulted in additional financial hardships for the organization.13 This form of decoupling from 
city-ownership, initiated by the cultural organization due to its own ambitions, may be a more 
common outcome. Just as the origins of a public-private partnership require a willing private 
partner, the dissolution of that partnership seems more often predicated by a non-profit’s 
 




willingness to pursue the private market over a continued public partnership. Results can be 
mixed. 
 
The Outliers: Jacksonville, Phoenix, Charlotte, and Houston 
 Interestingly, although all the cities with increased levels of annual spending on the arts 
also have high levels of facility ownership, several cities with similarly high levels of ownership 
failed to increase funding. What do Jacksonville, Phoenix, Charlotte, and Houston tell us about 
the possible causal mechanism at work in city arts funding, and do their positions as outliers 
provide additional insight and contextual nuance? 
 Timing and sequencing are two key elements to understanding a path-dependent 
argument of institutional development. The temporal ordering of development can shape 
outcomes, making attention to history critical to understanding institutions. “In many cases, the 
significance of early events or processes in the sequence may be amplified, while that of later 
events or processes is dampened. Thus, when a particular event or process occurs in a sequence 
will make a big a difference” (Pierson 2004, 64). 
 Jacksonville ($11.56), Houston ($11.25), and Charlotte ($10.28) all have 2017 annual per 
capita funding levels below the median value of $12.01, despite elevated levels of facility 
ownership among their most anchor arts facilities. Despite owning many of their art museums, 
performance halls, and ground leases for both the zoo and botanical gardens, Phoenix provided 
merely $4.35 in annual arts spending in its Fiscal Year 2017. 
  Most of the city-owned facilities in these cities were built in the latter half of the 
twentieth-century and into the early 2000s. Despite taking ownership of a newly built Phoenix 
Art Museum in 1959, Phoenix did not open the Symphony Hall until 1972, the Herberger 
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Theatre Center in 1989, and the Arizona Science Center in 1997. The oldest major museum in 
Phoenix, the Heard Museum (founded in 1929) and the Musical Instrument Museum opened in 
2010, are both entirely privately owned. 
 Houston’s city-ownership of public-private partnered cultural facilities is also heavily 
weighted by more recent additions. Of the oldest facilities in Houston, only the Miller Outdoor 
Theater and Houston Zoo have a history of city partnership. Other historic organizations such as 
The Museum of Fine Arts, Houston and the Houston Museum of Natural Science are privately 
owned, as is the Alley Theatre whose building was constructed in 1968.  Only more recently has 
the City of Houston taken ownership of more cultural facilities, particularly focused on the 
performing arts, such as Jesse H. Jones Hall for the Performing Arts (opened 1966), The 
Wortham Theater Center (opened 1987), and The Hobby Center for the Performing Arts (opened 
2002). 
 Apart from the Jacksonville Zoo and Gardens, the largest foundational art museum in 
Jacksonville is the privately run and owned Cummer Museum of Art and Gardens, with the land, 
art, and building being funded by a private estate in 1958. The city only took ownership of large 
cultural facilities in the latter half of the twentieth-century, building the Times-Union Center for 
the Performing Arts and purchasing the Florida Theater in 1981. 
 The late-stage public acquisition of these city’s cultural facilities may play a part in their 
low levels of annual support. Just as evidenced in Brooklyn, New York City, Seattle, and 
Chicago, it may take years or decades for the operating institutions to achieve elevated levels of 
operational support. Also, these cities are seemingly more likely to be engaged heavily with 
Business Leadership Coalitions (BLCs) in their public-private partnerships, increasing the role of 
business in their funding and management (Austin and McCaffrey 2002). With expanded 
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corporate governance in their public-private partnerships these cities may dampen expectations 
of an enhanced funding arrangement from the local government. Many of the previously 
mentioned new performance centers are operated by corporate management companies. This 
includes the Times-Union Center for the Performing Arts (ASM Global) and Jesse H. Jones Hall 
for the Performing Arts (Houston First Corporation). 
 Charlotte provides an example of how the initial period of public ownership may hinder 
the possibility of immediate operating support. Beginning in the 1970s, the City of Charlotte 
adopted an ambitious cultural facility plan to expand the city’s offering through public-private 
partnership, funded by public bonds paid off through revenues and private sector gifts. This plan 
yielded several multi-venue facilities that comprise the city-owned Levine Center for the Arts 
and the Blumenthal Performing Arts Center, among others (Arts & Science Council 2004). Still, 
despite the city owning five of the six major cultural facilities surveyed for this research, annual 
per capita funding for the arts is limited at only $10.28 per resident in fiscal year 2017. 
 However, what such analysis may overlook is the sustained obligations that can coincide 
with ambitious capital construction projects, especially when funded by the issuance of 
municipal public debt. The City of Charlotte uses the Cultural Facilities Debt Service Fund to 
pay the “principal, interest, and related costs for long-term debt associated with the City’s 
Cultural Facilities, including the construction of the Levine Center for the Arts Cultural 
Facilities” (City of Charlotte 2018, 159; Ryan 2012). Despite the Levine Center being completed 
in 2010, the City of Charlotte continues to fund the payment of debts and interest totaling more 
than nine million dollars annually. Those non-operating payments by the city exceed their annual 
operating expenditures for arts and culture.  
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 Such non-operating expenditures are obviously necessary in a start-up phase and are an 
important component of a city’s overall commitment to arts and culture. Cities like New York or 
San Francisco, with a substantial historical legacy of city-owned facilities, no longer have to 
amortize the startup costs and can thus shift payments towards maintenance and operations. It 
remains possible that Charlotte, once it pays off the debt obligation, may shift to providing 
operational funds for their newly debt-free city-owned facilities and their arts organizations. 
 These four outliers suggest two possible explanations for their low annual funding despite 
their high ownership levels. First, institutional development can be a slow-moving process. New 
York, San Francisco, or Chicago have all taken lengthy timelines to achieve their current high 
levels of arts expenditures. Otherwise, “presuming that policy changes are quickly translated into 
expenditure levels (that is, assuming rapidly unfolding outcomes) analysts may mistakenly 
construct temporally constricted causal accounts” (Pierson 2004, 91). 
 Secondly, the temporal sequencing of events may also be important. The fact that these 
four cities increased their building of facilities in a later-stage period of city development may 
hinder their ability to increase operating funding.  It may be true that, just as Kammen observed 
that the lack of a national cultural policy may be a policy, municipalities with late-stage 
ownership may not be able to overcome an entrenched municipal policy of low arts funding, 
particularly if they have become entrenched in a corporatist governance regime. 
 Figure 7 illustrates a branching path-dependence model in which ownership levels 
increase after an initial period, but funding remains low. Such a scenario may be in effect in the 
four cities which appear as outliers in the facility-ownership/increased-funding model. Whereas 
early stage adopters like New York, San Francisco, and Chicago were able to transition from 
their foundational arrangements into increased operational funding in later stages, perhaps a 
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city’s acquisition of ownership in a later period precludes an early shift into increased 
operational funding. Time may tell. 
 
 
Figure 7. Hypothetical Path Dependent Model of Initial Ownership vs Latter Stage Ownership  
  
 The current COVI-19 crisis has devastated arts and cultural activities and may also alter 
future funding patterns. Cities with high ownership levels may be compelled to increase or 
sustain existing support for public-private partnerships to prevent them from going out of 
business. Such an exogenous event may well have different impacts on cities with or without 
institutionalized arts and culture fields. The financial crisis may also compel the city 
governments of Jacksonville, Phoenix, Charlotte, and Houston, to increase their funding in the 
immediate future.  The next few years will provide an opportunity to understand further the 
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Implications on Outcomes in the Arts and Culture Sector: New York City’s Cultural 
Institutions Group 
 In addition to the positivist question of why some cities fund arts and culture at higher 
levels than others, it is worth asking what cities get in return. Does the increase in funding, as 
well as elevated levels of facility ownership, lead to different and better outcomes in the cultural 
sector?  
 This broad question deserves much more research than this study can provide, but we can 
consider some of the implications of the evidence already gathered, particularly regarding the 
case of New York City. In addition to being the birthplace of the American public-private arts 
partnership, New York City has the largest city-owned portfolio of facilities. Most of them 
belong to the Cultural Institutions Group, a quasi-formal group of city-owned cultural 
organizations with “represent a broad spectrum of cultural endeavor, from art and natural history 
museums to historical societies, theaters, concert halls, performing arts centers, botanical gardens 
and zoos” (New York City “Cultural Institutions Group”). The CIGs, in addition to receiving 
most of the cultural funding from the City, are also a focal point for the City’s CreateNYC 
cultural plan (New York City “CreateNYC Action Plan” 2019). The CIGs provide an ideal case-
study to observe the outcomes that a city government may expect from its ownership stake and 
funding of public-private cultural partners. 
The American Museum of Natural History and the Metropolitan Museum of Art provided 
the foundation for the CIG. Membership expanded considerably during the twentieth-century, 
amid a city-wide focus on heritage preservation and post-WWII urban redevelopment. Beginning 
in the 1960s and 70s, an effort to expand into all five boroughs to provide more equitable access 
to arts and culture (Levine 1993, 139; DCLA 2019) resulted in the inclusion of many new 
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organizations. By 1980, CIG membership had swelled to 25 members. The latest to join was the 
Museum of Jewish Heritage in 1998, while the Weeksville Heritage Center is now poised to 
become the first new member in more than 20 years. Figure 8 depicts the current members 
(excluding Weeksville) and table 3 summarizes them by borough.  
 
Figure 8. Map of New York City’s Cultural Institutions Group (CIG) Members. 
 
Table 3. Cultural Institutions Group Members by Borough of New York City. 
Manhattan Brooklyn Queens 
American Museum of Natural History Brooklyn Academy of Music 
Museum of the Moving 
Image 
Metropolitan Museum of Art Brooklyn Botanic Garden MoMA PS 1 
El Museo del Barrio Brooklyn Children’s Museum Flushing Town Hall 
Carnegie Hall Brooklyn Museum 




Lincoln Center for the Performing 
Arts 
Wildlife Conservation Society-
New York Aquarium 
Jamaica Center for Arts 
& Learning 
Museum of the City of New York    Queens Botanical Garden 
Museum of Jewish Heritage   Queens Museum 
New York City Ballet   Queens Theatre 
New York City Center     
Public Theater     
Studio Museum in Harlem      
The Bronx Staten Island   
Bronx County Historical Society 
Staten Island Children’s 
Museum   
Bronx Museum of the Arts 
Staten Island Historical 
Society   
New York Botanical Garden Staten Island Museum   
Wave Hill 
Staten Island Zoological 
Society   
Wildlife Conservation Society -Bronx 
Zoo 
Snug Harbor Cultural Center 
& Botanical Garden   
 
  
 The Mayor has the sole authority to add new institutions to the CIG. Although 
membership requires being in a city-owned facility, that is not a sufficient condition, as some 
organizations residing in city-owned buildings are not CIG members. The Weeksville Heritage 
Center is one such institution, although it has sought membership since it first opened its new 
city-owned building in 2013 (Lee 2013). CIG membership typically guarantees a significant 
share of the Department of Cultural Affairs (DCLA) annual budget prior to the distribution of 
funds to non-CIG arts and culture organizations, though the CIG share of the DCLA budget as 
declined from 80% to approximately 60%, even as its membership has expanded (Pogrebin 
2017).14 
 
14 The DCLA was established in 1976 but its history predates that, originating as the Office of Cultural 
Affairs under Mayor Wagner in 1962. The department’s own recorded history traces its origins to the 
original public-private partnership arrangements with the AMNH and Met Museum (New York City, 
“Department of Cultural Affairs History”). 
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Membership in the CIG does come at some cost, most explicitly in that the city demands 
that CIGs operate in a way that honors the goals and directives of the mayor who decides who is 
a CIG member and names the Commissioner of the DCLA. Presently those demands can be seen 
to include offering free or discounted admissions to holders of the municipal identity card, 
IDNYC. The IDNYC initiative is a key component of Mayor de Blasio’s agenda (New York City 
“IDNYC 2020”).  
Levine describes the funding of DCLA in the 1990s as advancing “strategic mayoral 
priorities such as ensuring public safety; preparing our children; promoting economic growth and 
opportunities” among others. “DCA is not an arts funder; it is an arm of city government” 
(Levine 1993). Currently, Mayor De Blasio has used the DCLA to engage with underserved 
communities as a way to further his “tale of two cities” narrative that drove his 2013 election 
efforts (New York City 2017). 
New York City’s current “CreateNYC” cultural plan is “intended to serve as a roadmap 
to a more inclusive, equitable, and resilient cultural ecosystem” (NYC “CreateNYC” 2017). The 
plan charges the CIG members to use City resources and funds to move away from the city’s 
cultural status quo toward engaging a broader range of the city’s communities. The multi-year 
plan is intended to “continue to invest in City-owned cultural assets and the Cultural Institutions 
Group (CIG), increasing support for those in low-income communities” This agenda helps to 
explain the expansion of the CIGs soon to include the Weeksville Heritage Center. Mayor 
DeBlasio aims to spread public arts funding more equitably throughout the city and moves 
toward that goal by adding a new CIG within a targeted low-income community. The funding 
that flows to CIGs makes them partners willing to engage with this agenda.  
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The CIGs represent a fully institutionalized cultural sector within city government. The 
group enjoys base-line support from the city budget and can count on a majority of DCLA funds. 
New York City, in turn, can use this leverage to get cooperation from these prominent and 
influential organizations. It is a symbiotic relationship and one that contains interrelated rules 
and routines that often bind behaviors on either side. 
This issue of equity of access has been an enduring conundrum for cultural facilities in 
New York City and across the United States. In the 1880s, public debate surrounded the question 
of whether the Metropolitan Museum of Art should be free to the public on Sundays. Prior to 
1891, the Met Museum charged 25-cents Monday and Tuesday, had free admission Wednesday 
through Saturday, and was closed on Sundays (Hood 2017, 244). This inherently discriminatory 
schedule worked against free access for members of the working class, who generally worked six 
days a week with Sunday as their only day to off. The city passed a resolution requiring 
institutions situated on public land, and receiving public subsidy, to provide free Sunday access 
and no longer “deprive thousands of people of this city who have no other time for visiting said 
museums…of recreation and intellectual development these museums were instituted to afford to 
all people” (Hood 2017, 244). 
Recounting what happed on the first free Sunday on May 31, 1891, Hood tells us “more 
than eleven thousand people showed up…Newspapers characterized the visitors as respectable 
clerks, salesmen, and workingmen who, despite being longtime city residents, were visiting the 
museum for the first time” (Hood 2017, 246.) Further investigation into the reporting of the day 
reveals “the grand success” as including women who “came in larger numbers, and almost every 
nationality was represented…Smart looking colored women with marvelously decorated male 
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companions showed that they appreciated the opportunity to visit the Museum” (New York Times 
1891).  
Such a tale shows the power of city involvement in the arts being a force for equal access. 
This does not ameliorate the challenges and discrimination evident during the period. Elsewhere 
in the account relief is expressed that visitors did not include “Essex Street Polish Jews and 
Thirty-Ninth Street and Eighth Avenue hod carriers, in ragged clothing and dilapidated hats,” 
suggesting all differences were not ignored (New York Times 1891).  
Presently, the city has given the Cultural Institutions Group one encompassing mandate, 
“provide cultural services accessible to all New Yorkers” (New York City, DCLA 2019). The 
1891 Sunday opening of the Met Museum shows that this is not a new request asked of public-
private cultural institutions. Today it is embedded in the Department of Cultural Affairs’ current 
plan, CreateNYC, which seeks to “increase equity in the City’s support for culture, support for 
artists and cultural workers from underrepresented groups, and investment in our neighborhoods” 
(NYC DCLA 2017). 
 Boston developed a similar plan starting in 2015 under the name Boston Creates. The 
Boston Creates cultural plan does not rely on a public-private partnership, as the city has none to 
rely on besides the city-operated Strand Theatre. The Boston Creates plan describes a vibrant yet 
fragmented arts and culture sector with inequitable access for residents. The inability for the City 
of Boston to implement reforms or set a strong city-wide agenda without additional funding both 
stems from the absence of, and may in the future require an increase in, public-private 
partnerships. Presently, the City has abandoned its touted BostonCreates.org website and the 





 Challenges remain in truly and accurately quantifying local government support for the 
arts. Available datasets are subject to varying degrees of participation and differing conceptions 
of what qualifies as arts and culture expenditures. Public spending for the arts may be hidden in 
many different budget categories, from local arts agencies to the parks department. These 
challenges help explain why researchers focus on federal cultural policy spending, which can be 
found in one uniform place. 
 This research into city arts funding has taken initial steps to explore the terra incognita of 
government arts policy. By applying a uniform framework for measuring local arts and culture 
funding and delving directly into city budget documents for evidence, the result is a reasonably 
accurate and consistent assessment of local arts and culture funding for 24 of the largest cities in 
America. Additionally, by identifying each city’s ownership stakes in anchor arts facilities, it has 
made possible a direct correlation between city-ownership rates and annual local government arts 
funding. This one factor explains a significant amount of the variation in local government 
support for the arts. 
 Fully explaining that link will require further study and historical analysis. Kathleen 
Thelen, quoting Fritz Scharpf, emphasizes the “ ‘need to have hypotheses that specify a causal 
model showing why and how a given constellation of factors could bring about the effect in 
question,’ but equally, ‘we need to have empirical evidence that the effect predicted by the 
hypothesis is in fact being produced’” (1999). This study has taken beginning steps on that 
journey.  
 The road could be followed in a number of different directions. How true might these 
findings be beyond these 24 cities? Also, will these relationships hold true within these 24 cites 
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over a sustained research period? What other demographic, economic, or political factors might 
be added to the dataset to create multivariate models with even more explanatory power? Time 
series data would permit us to understand how the relationships might evolve over time and 
assess more precisely whether a city’s addition of new facilities would expand or contract its 
budgetary commitments to its cultural sector. 
 Beyond arts and culture policy, this research demonstrated instances in which city 
expenditures can be baked into city budgets, particularly after a one-time capital commitment 
evolves into an all-the-time commitment, one that becomes institutionalized within government 
bureaucracy. It is not surprising, considering that the very concept of the city is rooted in its 
physical place and density, that the physical environment—its buildings and structures—informs 
how operating expenditures are made. 
 Arts and culture will most likely always be considered a non-essential service within city 
budgets. But as the current social distancing precautions set upon us by COVD-19 have proven, 
the need and want of residents to congregate is immeasurable. Arts and culture provide 
opportunities for that, creating shared spaces for ideas and expression. Coinciding with 
significant funding levels or not, arts and culture often play a defining role in urban life.  How 
the arts and culture sector moves forward, and how government plays a part in enhancing and 


























Owner of Facility 
Austin, TX The Contemporary Austin (2 locations) 0% Private 
Austin, TX The Long Center for the Performing Arts 100% City 
Austin, TX Film Society of Austin, Inc. 100% City 
Austin, TX Austin Theatre Alliance (Paramount Theatre & State 
Theater) 
0% Private 
Austin, TX Zilker Park (Austin Nature Science Center and 
Zilker Botanical Garden) 
100% City 
Austin, TX Zachary Scott Theatre Center 100% City 
 Austin average 67%  
Boston, MA Museum of Fine Arts, Boston 0% Private 
Boston, MA Symphony Hall 0% Private 
Boston, MA New England Aquarium 0% Private 
Boston, MA Museum of Science, Boston 0% Private, ground 
lease with State 
Boston, MA Boston Opera House 0% Private 
Boston, MA The Boch Center 0% Private 
 Boston average 0%  
Charlotte, NC Mint Museum 100% City 
Charlotte, NC Levine Center for the Arts (including Knight 
Theater, The Bechtler Museum of Modern Art, Mint 
Museum Uptown, and The Harvey B. Gantt Center 
for African- American Arts + Culture) 
100% City 
Charlotte, NC NASCAR Hall of Fame 100% City 
Charlotte, NC Discovery Place Museums (Science and Nature) 100% City 




Charlotte, NC Blumenthal Performing Arts Center (including Belk 
Theater, Booth Playhouse, and Stage Door Theater) 
100% City 
 Charlotte average 83%  
Chicago, IL The Art Institute of Chicago 100% City 
Chicago, IL Field Museum of Natural History 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Chicago, IL Shedd Aquarium 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Chicago, IL Civic Opera House 0% Private 
Chicago, IL Symphony Hall 0% Private 
Chicago, IL Museum of Science and Industry, Chicago 100% City 
Chicago, IL Lincoln Park Zoological Gardens 100% City 
 Chicago average 57%  
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Columbus, OH Columbus Museum of Art 0% Private 
Columbus, OH Ohio History Connection 0% State 
Columbus, OH Franklin Park Conservatory and Botanical Gardens 100% City (in partnership 
with County 
Columbus, OH Center of Science and Industry 100% City 
Columbus, OH Columbus Zoo and Aquarium 100% City 
Columbus, OH Lincoln Theater 100% City 
Columbus, OH Ohio Theater 0 Private 
 Columbus average 57%  
Dallas, TX Dallas Museum of Art 100% City 
Dallas, TX The AT&T Performing Arts Center 100% City 
Dallas, TX Dallas Theater Center 100% City 
Dallas, TX Perot Museum of Nature and Science 100% City 
Dallas, TX Nasher Sculpture Center 0% Private 
Dallas, TX The Morton H. Meyerson Symphony Center 100% City 
 Dallas average 83%  
Denver, CO Denver Art Museum 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Denver, CO Denver Center for the Performing Arts 100% City 
Denver, CO Denver Film Society 0%  
Denver, CO Denver Museum of Nature and Science 100%  
Denver, CO Denver Zoo 100%  
Denver, CO Denver Botanic Gardens 100%  
 Denver average 75%  
Detroit, MI Detroit Institute of Arts 0% Private 
Detroit, MI Detroit Symphony Orchestra/Max M. Fisher Music 
Center 
0% Private 
Detroit, MI Music Hall Center for the Performing Arts 0% Private 
Detroit, MI Detroit Opera House 0% Private 
Detroit, MI Michigan Science Center 0% Private 
Detroit, MI Detroit Zoo 100% City 
Detroit, MI Charles H. Wright Museum of African American 
History 
100% City 
 Detroit average 29%  
El Paso, TX El Paso Museum of Art 100% City 
El Paso, TX El Paso Museum of History 100% City 
El Paso, TX Plaza Theatre 100% City 
El Paso, TX El Paso Holocaust Museum and Study Center 0% Private 
El Paso, TX Abraham Chavez Theater 100% City 
El Paso, TX The El Paso Zoo 100% City 
 El Paso average 83%  
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Fort Worth, TX Fort Worth Museum of Science and History 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Fort Worth, TX Kimbell Art Museum 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Fort Worth, TX Bass Performance Hall 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Fort Worth, TX Amon Carter Museum of American Art 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Fort Worth, TX Fort Worth Museum of Modern Art 0% Private 
Fort Worth, TX Fort Worth Zoo 100% City 
Fort Worth, TX Fort Worth Community Arts Center 100% City 
 Fort Worth average 57%  
Houston, TX Museum of Fine Arts, Houston 0% Private 
Houston, TX Houston Museum of Natural Science 0% Private 
Houston, TX The Wortham Theater Center 100% City 
Houston, TX Houston Zoo 100% City 
Houston, TX The Hobby Center for the Performing Arts 100% City 
Houston, TX Jesse H. Jones Hall for the Performing Arts 100% City 
Houston, TX Miller Outdoor Theater 100% City 
Houston, TX Alley Theatre 100% City 
 Houston average 63%  
Indianapolis, IN Newfields (Indianapolis Museum of Art) 0% Private 
Indianapolis, IN Eiteljorg Museum of American Indians and Western 
Art 
0% Private 
Indianapolis, IN Indianapolis Art Center 0% Private 
Indianapolis, IN Indiana Historical Society 0% Private 
Indianapolis, IN Indianapolis Symphony Orchestra/Herbert Circle 
Theatre 
0% Private 
Indianapolis, IN Indiana Repertory Theatre/Indiana Theatre 100% City 
Indianapolis, IN The Children's Museum of Indianapolis 0% Private 
 Indianapolis average 14%  
Jacksonville, FL Museum of Science and History of Jacksonville 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Jacksonville, FL Times-Union Center for the Performing Arts 100% City 
Jacksonville, FL Jacksonville Zoo and Gardens 100% City 
Jacksonville, FL The Florida Theater 100% City 
Jacksonville, FL The Cummer Museum of Arts and Gardens 0% Private 
Jacksonville, FL Museum of Contemporary Art, Jacksonville 0% University of North 
Florida 
 Jacksonville average 58%  
Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles County Museum of Art 0% County 
Los Angeles, CA Performing Arts Center of Los Angeles County 0% County 
Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History 0% County 
Los Angeles, CA Getty Center 0% Private 




Los Angeles, CA Los Angeles Zoo and Botanical Gardens 100% City 
Los Angeles, CA Skirball Cultural Center 0% Private 
 Los Angeles average 21%  
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 
Frist Art Museum 100% City 
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 
Tennessee Performing Arts Center 0% State 
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 
Schermerhorn Symphony Center 0% Private 
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 
The Parthenon 100% City 
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 
Cheekwood Botanical Garden and Museum of Art 0% Private 
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 
The Country Music Hall of Fame and Museum 0% Private 
Nashville-Davidson, 
TN 




Tennessee State Museum 0% State 
 Nashville-Davidson average 31%  
New York City, NY Metropolitan Museum of Art 100% City 
New York City, NY American Museum of Natural History 100% City 
New York City, NY Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts 100% City 
New York City, NY Bronx Zoo 100% City 
New York City, NY Carnegie Hall 100% City 
New York City, NY The New York Botanical Garden 100% City 
New York City, NY Museum of Modern Art 0% Private 
New York City, NY Brooklyn Academy of Music 100% City 
 New York City average 88%  
Philadelphia, PA Philadelphia Museum of Art 100% City 
Philadelphia, PA Kimmel Center for the Performing Arts 0% Private 
Philadelphia, PA The Philadelphia Zoo 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Philadelphia, PA The Museum of the American Revolution 0% Private 
Philadelphia, PA Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts 0% Private 
Philadelphia, PA The Franklin Institute 0% Private 
Philadelphia, PA The Mann Center for the Performing Arts  100% City 
Philadelphia, PA The Academy of Music 0% Private 
 Philadelphia average 31%  
Phoenix, AZ Phoenix Art Museum 100% City 
Phoenix, AZ Phoenix Zoo 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Phoenix, AZ Musical Instrument Museum 0% Private 
Phoenix, AZ Desert Botanical Garden 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
Phoenix, AZ Heard Museum 0% Private 
Phoenix, AZ Symphony Hall 100% City 
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Phoenix, AZ Arizona Science Center 100% City 
Phoenix, AZ Herberger Theater Center 100% City 
 Phoenix average 63%  
Portland, OR Portland Art Museum 0% Private 
Portland, OR Portland'5 Centers for the Arts  100% City 
Portland, OR Portland Center Stage at The Armory 0% Private 
Portland, OR The Oregon Museum of Science and Industry 0% Private 
Portland, OR Portland Children's Museum 100% Ground Lease with 
City 
Portland, OR Oregon Zoo 
 
100% City 
 Portland average 50%  
San Antonio, TX San Antonio Museum of Art 0% Private 
San Antonio, TX The Witte Museum 100% City 
San Antonio, TX The DoSeum (The San Antonio Children's Museum) 0% Private 
San Antonio, TX The McNay Art Museum 0% Private 
San Antonio, TX San Antonio Zoo 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
San Antonio, TX Brisco Western Art Museum 0% Private 
San Antonio, TX The Tobin Center for the Performing Arts 0% Private 
 San Antonio average 21%  
San Diego, CA San Diego Museum of Art 100% City 
San Diego, CA Joan and Irwin Jacobs Music Center 0% Private 
San Diego, CA San Diego Natural History Museum 100% City 
San Diego, CA The Old Globe 50% Ground Lease with 
City 
San Diego, CA San Diego Zoo 100% City 
San Diego, CA San Diego Theatres (Civic Theatre and Balboa 
Theatre) 
100% City 
 San Diego average 75%  
San Francisco, CA Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco (M. H. de 
Young Memorial Museum and Legion of Honor) 
100% City 
San Francisco, CA San Francisco Museum of Modern Art 0% Private 
San Francisco, CA San Francisco War Memorial and Performing Arts 
Center 
100% City 
San Francisco, CA Asian Art Museum 100% City 
San Francisco, CA San Francisco Zoo 100% City 
San Francisco, CA California Academy of Sciences 100% City 
San Francisco, CA Exploratorium 100% City 
San Francisco, CA Yerba Buena Center for the Arts 100% City via 
Redevelopment 
Agency 
 San Francisco average 88%  
San Jose, CA San Jose Museum of Art 100% City 
San Jose, CA San Jose Children's Discovery Museum 100% City 
San Jose, CA California Theater 100% City 
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San Jose, CA San Jose Center for the Performing Arts and 
Montgomery Theater 
100% City 
San Jose, CA Tech Museum of Innovation 100% City 
San Jose, CA The Computer History Museum 0% Private 
 San Jose average 83%  
Seattle, WA Seattle Art Museum/Asian Art Museum/Olympic 
Sculpture Park 
33% Private/City/Private 
Seattle, WA Benaroya Hall 100% City 
Seattle, WA Seattle Center (Multiple Venues) 100% City 
Seattle, WA Seattle Aquarium 100% City 
Seattle, WA Museum of Pop Culture 0% City 
Seattle, WA Woodland Park Zoo 100% City 
Seattle, WA Seattle Theatre Group (Paramount, Moore and 
Neptune Theatres) 
0% Private 

































Appendix B: Budget Sources for Fiscal Year 2017 Expenditures 
 
City of Austin, 2016/2017 Approved Budget Volume One and Two 
https://assets.austintexas.gov/budget/16-17/downloads/Approved_Volume_1_FINAL.pdf 
https://assets.austintexas.gov/budget/16-17/downloads/Approved_Volume_2_FINAL.pdf 
City of Boston, Fiscal Year 2017 Adopted Budget, Summary Budget and Fiscal Year 2017 









City of Chicago, Annual Appropriation Ordinance for Year 2017 and The Chicago Park District 









City of Dallas, Annual Budget for Fiscal Year 2016-2017 as Approved on September 21, 2016 by 
the Honorable Mayor and Members of the Dallas City Council 
https://dallascityhall.com/departments/budget/financialtransparency/AnnualBudget/FY20
1617-AdoptedBudgetBook.pdf 
City and County of Denver, Mayor’s 2017 Budget 
https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/344/documents/Budget/2017/
Mayors_2017_Budget.pdf 
City of Detroit, FY 2017 - 2020 Four Year Plan - Section C - Legal Budget 
https://detroitmi.gov/document/fy-2017-2020-four-year-plan-section-c-legal-budget 
City of El Paso: Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Adopted by City Council August 23, 2016 
https://www.elpasotexas.gov/~/media/files/coep/office%20of%20management%20and%
20budget/fy17%20budget/fy17%20adopted%20budget%20book.ashx?la=en 





City of Houston, Adopted Operating Budget for the Period July 1, 2016 to June 30, 2017 and 
Mayors Office of Cultural Affairs, Grants and Funding FY 2017 
https://houstontx.gov/budget/17budadopt/FY2017_Adopted_Budget.pdf 
https://www.houstontx.gov/culturalaffairs/grants-and-funding.html 
City of Indianapolis, 2017 Adopted Budget for the Consolidated City of Indianapolis Marion 





City of Jacksonville, Adopted Annual Budget Fiscal Year 2016 – 2017 
https://www.coj.net/departments/finance/docs/budget/fy16-17-annual-budget.aspx 
City of Los Angeles, Budget Fiscal Year 2016-2017, Modified and Adopted by The Council 
https://lacontroller.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Budget-2016-17.pdf 




City of New York, Adopted Budget Fiscal Year 2017, Expense Revenue Contract 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/omb/downloads/pdf/erc6-16.pdf 
City of Philadelphia, The Mayor’s Operating Budget in Brief for the Fiscal Year 2017 as 
Approved by the Council – June 2016 
https://www.phila.gov/finance/pdfs/FY17FinalBudgetinBriefAdopted.pdf 
City of Phoenix, Citywide Inventory of Programs 2016-17 Adopted Budget and 2017-18 
Preliminary Estimate https://www.phoenix.gov/budgetsite/budget-books/Inventory-of-
Programs-2016-17.pdf 
City of Portland Oregon, Adopted Budget Fiscal 2016-17 Volume One and Two 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/cbo/article/583311 
https://www.portlandoregon.gov/cbo/article/583313 
City of San Antonio, Adopted Operating and Capital Budget, 2017 
https://www.sanantonio.gov/portals/0/files/budget/fy2017/FY2017FinalAdoptedBudget.p
df 
City of San Diego, Adopted Budget, FY: 2017 Budget Overview and Schedules, Volume 1 
https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/fy17_adopted_budget_-_full.pdf 
City and County of San Francisco, Budget and Appropriation Ordinance, Fiscal Year ending 
June 30, 2016 and Fiscal Year ending June 30, 2017 
http://openbook.sfgov.org/webreports/details3.aspx?id=2182 
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